Abstract. Separation of access control logic from other components of applications facilitates uniform enforcement of policies across applications in enterprise systems. This approach is popular in attribute-based access control (ABAC) systems and is embodied in the XACML standard. For this approach to be practical in an enterprise system, the access control decision engine must be scalable, able to quickly respond to access control requests from many concurrently running applications. This is especially challenging for stateful (also called history-based) access control policies, in which access control requests may trigger state updates. This paper presents an policy evaluation algorithm for stateful ABAC policies that achieves high throughput by distributed processing, using a specialized multi-version concurrency control scheme to deal with possibly conicting concurrent updates. The algorithm is especially designed to achieve low latency, by minimizing the number of messages on the critical path of each access control decision.
Introduction
Separation of access control logic from other components of applications facilitates uniform enforcement of policies across applications in enterprise systems.
This approach is adopted in the ISO standard for access control in open systems [13] and the XACML standard 1 . Servers that run the access control policy evaluation algorithm and provide access control decisions to applications are called policy decision points (PDPs) in XACML terminology. In this paper, we refer to them simply as servers, since we do not discuss other kinds of server.
For this approach to be practical in an enterprise system, the policy evaluation algorithm must be scalable, able to quickly respond to access control requests from many concurrently running applications. To scale beyond the capacity of a single server, distributed policy evaluation algorithms are needed, to coordinate concurrent processing of requests on multiple servers. This is relatively straightforward if the policy and the information it references are static.
This material is based on work supported in part by NSF Grants CNS-1421893, and CCF-1414078, ONR Grant N00014-15-1-2208, AFOSR Grant FA9550-14-1-0261, and DARPA Contract FA8650-15-C-7561. Any opinions, ndings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reect the views of these agencies. 1 http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/xacml/ However, this is challenging for stateful (also called state-modifying, dynamic, or history-based) access control policies, in which access control requests may trigger state updates, i.e., updates to information referenced by the policy. The classical examples of stateful access control policies are dynamic separation-of-duty (DSOD) policies, such as the Chinese wall policy [5] and DSOD in role-based access control (RBAC) [2] . Another classic category of stateful access control policies are usage control policies [20] , such as policies that limit the number of times a user can view a video or the number of videos that a user with a particular type of subscription can view each month. The research literature contains numerous additional examples of stateful access control policies, policy models, and policy evaluation algorithms [10, 11, 6, 3, 4, 17, 12, 19, 14, 8, 22, 18] . In the context of Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), the updated state is typically attribute data.
The main challenge in distributed policy evaluation algorithms for stateful policies is ensuring serializability, as in concurrent transaction processing in databases [21] . Processing of each access control request, including its reads of attribute data and its updates to attribute data, should be serializable with respect to processing of other requests. Since concurrent requests may read or write the same attribute data, a concurrency control mechanism is needed to ensure this.
To illustrate the importance of serializability in this context, consider a typical Chinese wall policy in which companies A and B are in the same conict of interest (COI) class, so user who has accessed documents of one them cannot access documents of the other. When a server allows a request for access to documents of either company, it updates a user attribute to reect this. Suppose a devious user concurrently submits an access request for a document of company A to one server, and an access request for a document of company B to another server. In a non-serializable execution in which both requests are evaluated in the initial state (where the user has not accessed any documents), both requests could be permitted, violating the intended policy. In a serializable execution, the result must be equivalent to a serial execution, where one of the requests sees the eect of the update performed by the other request, causing the second request to be denied, as it should be.
A straightforward approach to this problem is to use a distributed replicated database that supports serializability for multi-row transactions, and to evaluate each request in a transaction. However, this requirement eliminates well-known scalable NoSQL databases, such as Bigtable [7] , Cassandra 2 , and MongoDB 3 , which achieve scalability in part by supporting only single-row transactions.
Master-slave replication in SQL databases, such as MySQL 4 , allows multi-row transactions, but has limited scalability, because all read-write transactions must be submitted to a single master server, and provides inadequate consistency guarantees, because slaves can return slightly out-of-date data. Multi-phase commit protocols, such as in Oracle, IBM DB2, and Microsoft SQL Sever, allow multirow tranasctions and ensure serializability, but are less scalable.
Decat et al. present a distributed policy evaluation algorithm for stateful ABAC policies [8] that is more scalable than multi-phase commit protocols, by exploiting the fact that evaluation of an ABAC request involves at most two objects (i.e., two rows), typically called the subject and the resource. Their algorithm uses a specialized scheme for optimistic concurrency control [21, Section 15.5] . Their experimental results demonstrate that their algorithm scales well in terms of throughput. However, their algorithm incurs a signicant increase in latency, since processing of each request involves a chain of 6 messages (including the messages to and from the client). This paper presents a new distributed policy evaluation algorithm for stateful ABAC policies. The algorithm is called FACADE (Fast Access Control Algorithm with Distributed Evaluation). It uses a specialized scheme for multiversion timestamp ordering concurrency control [21, Section 15.6 ] that simultaneously achieves low latency by minimizing the length of the message chain on the critical path (i.e., the message chain ending with the result sent to the client). Low latency is of obvious importance for interactive applications: developers struggle to keep the latency of the application's core functionality within limits acceptable to users, especially for multi-tier enterprise applications, where many requests involve processing by multiple servers (web servers, application servers, database servers, etc.), and latency contributions from non-core functionality such as access control are acceptable only if they are low. Low latency is also important for batch applications. These applications often process large amounts of data, hence requiring many access control checks. If the latency of these checks is not kept very low, the repeated delays in the core application processing will cause poor system utilization. Reducing the number of messages per request has the additional benet of reducing the required network capacity.
FACADE processes read-only requests dierently than read-write requests, in contrast to Decat 
Algorithm
System Architecture. We adopt the system architecture in [8] . There are two types of hosts: clients and servers. Each client runs applications and a small client-side stub that interacts with the access control servers. Each server runs three kinds of processes: a coordinator, which receives requests from clients and is responsible for concurrency control, a database, which stores a copy of the attribute data used by the policy, and one or more workers, which evaluate requests based on the access control policy and send the result to the coordinator and/or client.
Each worker reads attribute data from the co-located replica of the database.
Workers never update the database. The set of objects is partitioned across the set of coordinators. Thus, for each object x, there is a unique coordinator, denoted coord(x), responsible for x; we also say that coord(x) manages x. Only coord(x) submits updates of x to the master database (this is done using a standard database connector, such as ODBC or JDBC, regardless of whether the master database is on the same server or a dierent server Note that reads never cause aborts, and read-only transactions always commit.
To support conict checking, each coordinator maintains a data structure containing the read timestamp and write timestamp of every version of an attribute created during the coordinator's current session (i.e., since the coordinator process started running). This data structure does not store the value of each version, since it is not needed for conict checking. Entries for old versions can be garbage-collected; details are straightforward and omitted. Although this data structure has some information overlap with cachedUpdates, we keep the two data structures separate for clarity, because they serve dierent purposes. This data structure is accessed using two functions. getVersion(x,attr,ts) returns the most recent version of x.attr written at or before ts; if no such version exists, it returns a special version v with v.wts=0 and v.rts=0, representing the last version written in the previous session (any timestamp guaranteed to precede all timestamps generated in the current session is safe; 0 is a convenient choice). addVersion(x,attr,ts) creates and stores a version of x.attr with write timestamp and read timestamp equal to ts.
Database. To avoid use of a heavyweight multi-phase commit protocol in the database, we assume a database that supports master-slave (also called primarysecondary) replication, in which updates are committed at one replica, called the master or primary, and the updates are visible at the other replicas, called slaves or secondaries, within a known time limit, called the database latency. The cache is accessed using the function cachedUpdates(x), which returns the set of cached updates to x. FACADE needs to store multiple versions of objects in the database. This can easily be done in any database, by including a version column in the database schema. Our implementation using MySQL works this way.
Request objects. We model requests as objects with elds subject, resource, ts (timestamp), cachedUpdates[i] (i=1 and i=2 for piggybacked cached updates to subject and resource, respectively), worker (worker selected to evaluate this request), and evalResult (result of evaluating the request, described below).
Policy language. FACADE is independent of the details of the policy language.
Any ABAC policy language can be used, provided it can express updates. For example, XACML can be used, with updates expressed as obligations, as in [20, 8] .
Details of the policy language are abstracted behind an interface containing a single function evaluateRequest(policy,request) that returns an EvalResult object with these elds: decision (permit or deny), readAttr[i] (i=1 and i=2 for the set of attributes of the subject and resource, respectively, read during evaluation of the request), updatedObj (the index of the updated object, if any, otherwise -1), rdonlyObj (if updatedObj > 0, this is the index of the other object, otherwise -1), and updates (set of attribute-value pairs, specifying updates to updatedObj). The index values are interpreted as: 1=subject, 2=resource. evaluateRequest evaluates the request using attribute values current as of req.ts, reading values from req.cachedUpdates when they exist, otherwise reading values from the database using queries with timestamp req.ts.
Bounds on attribute accesses. Our algorithm can exploit bounds on attribute read and written by requests, when available, to improve performance. In particular, for a request r, for each object x that might be accessed by r (namely, the subject and resource), the client stub provides (1) a lower bound on the set of attributes of x that will denitely be read by r, (2) an upper bound on the set of attributes of x that might be read by r, and (3) an upper bound on the set of attributes of x that might be updated by the request. It is always safe to use the trivial bounds, i.e., the empty set for (1) and the set of all attributes for (2) and (3). When tighter bounds are available for (1), the algorithm can sometimes use them to conclude that a request denitely conicts with an in-progress request r, without waiting to learn the exact set of attributes read by r. When tighter bounds are available for (2) and (3), the algorithm can sometimes use them to conclude that two requests involving the same object access disjoint sets of attributes and hence cannot conict, without waiting to learn the exact sets of attributes they accessed. Note that these situations arise only in the typically small fraction of cases that two concurrent requests access the same object, and at least one of the requests is not known to be read-only.
Tighter bounds can often be obtained from basic knowledge about the request and the policy. The code or rules dening these bounds could be written manually for small systems or generated by a straightforward static analysis of the access control policy, based on the types of object and type of action in each rule and the names of the attributes read and written by each rule. For example, consider an access control system for an online video service, in which requests to play a video are subject to usage control to limit the number of views, and all other requests (browsing the video catalog, paying for a video, account maintenance, etc.) are not. In this system, a client can identify a request as read-only if the resource type is not video or the action is not play. These bounds are provided by dening (possibly using trivial bounds) the following policy-specic functions, where x is req.subject or req.resource.
defReadAttr(x, req) is a set of attributes of x denitely read by req. mightReadAttr(x, req) is an upper bound on the set of attributes of x that might be read by req (including denitely read attributes).
mightWriteAttr(x, req) is an upper bound on the set of attributes of x that might be updated by req.
Sequence Diagrams. We give brief overviews of Decat et al.'s algorithm and our algorithm, focusing on the message patterns shown in the sequence diagrams in updates data structures used for conict detection and then forwards the request (with piggybacked cached committed updates) to coordR, the coordinator for the resource of the request, which does the same and then forwards to the request to a worker on the same server. The worker evaluates the request and then sends the result to coordS. coordS checks for conicts involving the subject; specically, it checks whether any attribute of the subject read by the request was updated after it forwarded the request to coordR (any such update was not piggybacked on the request and hence might not have been used in its evaluation). If there is no conict, it forwards the result to coordR, which performs a similar conict check and, if there is no conict, commits the updates (if any) to the resource, and then sends the outcome of the conict check to coordS. coordS commits the updates to the subject and then sends the decision to the client. If either coordinator detects a conict, the request is restarted. After coordS sends the result to coordR and before it receives the outcome of coordR's conict check, it treats the request's updates to the subject specially, as tentative updates; for details, see [8] .
Overview of FACADE for read-only requests. The client sends the request to coord1, the coordinator for one of the objects accessed by the request (either one is ne). coord1 updates data structures used for conict detection and then forwards the request (with piggybacked cached committed updates) to coord2, the coordinator for the other object accessed by the request. coord2 updates its data structures and forwards the request to the worker. The worker evaluates the request, sends the decision to the client, and sends the sets of read attributes of the subject and resource to their respective coordinators, which update the read timestamps of the read versions. It is safe for the worker to send the decision directly to the client, because read-only requests never abort in FACADE.
Note that this message pattern is used for any request that turns out to be read-only, regardless of whether this is known in advance, i.e., regardless of whether mightWriteAttr is empty for either object involved in the request.
Overview of FACADE for read-write requests. When the client sends the request to the coordinator for an object not updated by the request, we say that the client correctly predicts a read-only object for the request. This is guaranteed if mightWriteAttr returns an empty set for at least one object involved in the request, and has 50% probability otherwise. It is preferable for the client to send the request to such a coordinator, denoted coordR, because the worker sends the evaluation result to the coordinator for the updated object, denoted coordW, and that result message is local if the worker is co-located with coordW, which happens if coordR receives the request from the client and forwards it to coordW. If mightWriteAttr returns a non-empty set for both objects, then the client arbitrarily selects a coordinator to which to send the request. If that turns out to be coordW, we say that the client incorrectly predicts a read-only object for the request. The only consequence is that the worker's result message is a network message instead of a local message.
When the client correctly predicts a read-only object for the request, the client sends the request to the coordinator for that object, denoted coordR.
coordR updates data structures used for conict detection and then forwards the request (with piggybacked cached committed updates) to coordW. The worker evaluates the request and sends the result, including the decision and the sets of read and written attributes of the subject and resource, to coordW. coordW checks for conicts; specically, it checks whether any attribute updated by this request was read by a request with a later timestamp. Even if there is no conict yet, a conict could arise later, involving a request with a later timestamp that has already been forwarded and might read the attribute. A set of such requests, called pending might read requests, is associated with each version of an attribute. The worker waits until there are no such pending might read requests and then checks for conicts again. If there is no conict, it commits the updates, sends the decision to the client, and sends the set of read attributes of the other object to the other coordinator.
When the client incorrectly predicts a read-only object for the request, the message pattern is the same, except that coordW receives the request rst and then forwards it to coordR, and the evaluation result message from the worker to coordW is a network message instead of a local message.
Handling of requests known to be read-only. A request req is known to be readonly i mightWriteAttr(req.subject, req) and mightWriteAttr(req.resource, req) are empty. Handling of requests known to be read-only is described separately from handling of other requests, for ease of understanding, although the two are similar in places, and the code for them is integrated in our implementation.
Handling of requests known to be read-only follows the pseudocode in Figure 2 .
The pseudocode syntax is generally Python-like, except we denote tuples using angle brackets instead of parentheses. Implicitly, coarse-grain locking is used to ensure that coordinators process each incoming message atomically, i.e., without interruption by processing of other messages (as an optimization, ner-grained locking could be used).
Handling of read-write requests. Handling of other requests follows the pseudocode in Figures 3 and 4 .
Liveness. The algorithm presented in the pseudocode is deadlock-free: the inequality on timestamps in the await statement in Figure 4 ensures that two requests cannot be stuck waiting for each other. However, it can starve some read-write requests. For example, a long stream of reads to an attribute x.attr can cause the condition in the await statement in Figure 4 to remain true for a long time, causing a pending update to x.attr to starve. The underlying reason is that FACADE gives precedence to reads over writes, in the sense that reads never abort, and writes can be aborted due to conicting reads.
To counter-balance this, and thereby help prevent starvation of writes, we modify the algorithm to delay reads in two cases (these modications are not reected in the pseudocode).
(1) After a coordinator c receives "request", req, 1 from a client, if req might update req.obj [1] , c delays processing of incoming requests that potentially conict with req (temporarily storing them in a queue) until c determines the outcome (commit or restart) of the current execution of req, at which time c processes the delayed requests normally. An incoming request req2 potentially conicts with req if req2 might read an attribute that req might update. (2) After a coordinator c receives an evaluation result message "result", req that includes updates to an object x managed by c, while c is waiting for the await condition to become true, c delays processing of incoming requests that potentially conict with those updates until c determines the outcome (commit or restart) for req, at which time c processes the delayed requests normally An incoming request req2 potentially conicts with the updates if req2 might read one of the updated attributes. Note that these two kinds of delays remove entries for req from all pendingMightReads sets # tell the other coordinator to restart processing of this request roCoord = coord(req.subject) if req.evalResult.rdonlyObj==1 else coord(req.resource) send "restart", req to roCoord Fig. 4 . Handling of requests not known to be read-only, part 2.
(2) The await statement in Figure 4 waits for all relevant pending reads to complete before checking whether any of them conict with the pending update. As an optimization, when each relevant pending read completes, the coordinator immediately checks whether it conicts with the pending update, and if so, immediately restarts the request performing the update. (3) To reduce the number of database queries, workers piggyback data read from the database on messages sent to coordinators, and coordinators add it to the data structure that caches recent committed updates. Note that caching of attribute data is done only by coordinators, not workers, because a coordinator performs all updates to objects it manages and hence knows when cached data is stale (relative to a specied request timestamp).
Fault-tolerance. Like Decat et al. in [8] , we focus in this paper on scalability and leave detailed consideration of fault-tolerance for future work. We briey sketch how to extend our algorithm to tolerate crash failures. A fault-monitoring service is needed to detect crashes and restart crashed processes. Requests that were inprogress at the time of a crash might be dropped. If a client does not receive a decision for a request in a reasonable amount of time, the client can re-submit the request with the same identier. If the request is read-only, the worker simply re-evaluates it in the current state. If the request performs updates, the worker checks whether the request already committed, and if so, re-sends the original decision, otherwise re-evaluates the request in the current state. To support this, when a coordinator commits the attribute updates for a request, it also inserts a record containing the request id and decision in a request log table. The worker looks up the request id in this table before evaluating a request.
Evaluation
Implementation. We implemented FACADE in DistAlgo [16, 15] nWorker: number of workers per coordinator. nObj: number of objects in database. We use objects with 10 attributes, two of which are mutable (i.e., might be updated by access control policy rules).
nRequest: total number of requests (split evenly among the clients) pWrite: probability that a request is read-write; other requests are read-only. pSameCoord: probability that the two objects involved in a request have the same coordinator. As discussed below, we emulate experiments with nCoord coordinators using our platform with 2 coordinators by setting pSameCoord=1/nCoord. Latency. To evaluate how the performance, primarily latency, of FACADE would depend on the number of coordinators in a system, we ran experiments analogous to the latency experiments in [8, Section 3.4, Figure 9 ]. We use nClient=1, like they do, to measure the intrinsic latency of the algorithm, in the absence of contention. In their experiment, latency is measured instead as a function of the actual number of coordinators. However, the number of coordinators aects the latency only indirectly, by aecting the probability that the same coordinator is responsible for the two objects involved in the request. For clarity, we measure the latency directly as a function of this probability, by making pSameCoord a workload parameter, as described above. This also allows us to use a smaller platform for the experiments. Values of the other xed workload parameters in these experiments are nWorker=1, nObj=1000, nRequest=5000 and pWrite=0. Chadwick describes a distributed architecture for a XACML-based stateful policy framework, consisting of multiple policy decision points (PDPs) interacting with a centralized database containing the mutable state [6] . Each PDP locks all relevant rows in the database before evaluating a request. The design has limited scalability, due to the centralized database and locking.
Alzahrani et al. describe a similar distributed architecture [1] , without committing to a specic approach to storage of the state. They briey mention a few alternatives, e.g., in a centralized database, or replicated at or partitioned among the PDPs, but do not discuss any of them in detail.
Dhankhar et al. consider evaluation of stateful distributed XACML policies.
Dierent PDPs have dierent policies, and the policies can refer to each other [9] . Concurrency control is provided by a centralized lock manager. Each PDP locks all relevant attributes before evaluating a request. The centralized lock manager limits scalability of their design.
Kelbert and Pretschner describe a fault-tolerant decentralized infrastructure for enforcement of usage control policies [14] . They rely on the database, Cassandra 2 , for concurrency control. As mentioned in Section 1, Cassandra provides serializability only for single-row transactions, so their system does not support serializable evaluation of requests involving attributes of two objects.
Weber et al. present a framework for stateful access control policies in distributed systems based on weakly consistent replication of the state, as provided by eventually consistent data stores [22] . In contrast, our design is based on the traditional notion of strong consistency. When weak consistency is acceptable, it potentially allows more fault-tolerance and scalability. They do not present a completed implementation or any performance results.
